Commentary on American Foreign Policy

The recent "opening to Iran" is a classic example of a post-WWII U.S. foreign policy marked all too often by naivete, in consistency, lack of credibility, hypocrisy, and lack of common sense.

The unfortunate point is that the Iran affair was not unusual, unexpected, or surprising — even considering that Iran had not yet made amends for trampling America's national honor into the ground. The burning question is what was the thinking of U.S. officials responsible for this self-defeating foreign policy decision?

A curious mix of peculiarly American beliefs, concepts and attitudes underlay the decision. Among them: a distorted perception of the national interests of the United States and Iran, American paranoia over communism (in part attributable to an inability to separate perception of political dogma from the people practicing it), and the moral assumption that Iran could be lured into a "friendly" relationship through "moderates." Apparently not yet clear to some U.S. officials is that Iran's interest is countering and if possible destroying what the United States stands for in the world. In that context, a moderate in Iran is surely no more than one who differs as to timing and tactics.

Here are some other examples of international undertakings that post WWII foreign policy has led to. All of them were underlain by combinations of fundamental concepts, beliefs and attitudes ingrained in American thinking (manifest destiny, God is on America's side, communism is a disease to be eradicated at any cost, democracy is the only political ideology capable of producing desired economic and social progress, ideas and things American are innately superior to foreign ideas and things, Americans are innately superior to foreigners, and all problems can be solved). The thesis is that these concepts, beliefs and attitudes lead U.S. policy officials to misjudge real U.S. interests and to misunderstand or ignore the real interests of other nations.

Post-WWII Agreements with the USSR

The clearly evident interest of the USSR following the end of WWII was creation of a buffer zone in Europe as one means of protecting Soviet security. (Imperial Russia had the same objective) By negotiating and signing agreements allowing the Soviet Union to achieve her objective, and thus to divide Europe, U.S. (and allied) policy officials sacrificed their own goal of a politically united Europe. Moreover, the agreements played into the hands of an obviously expansionist communist state sending a signal interpreted by the Soviets as signifying a lack of appreciation on the part of the West of geopolitical dynamics.

The Thirty-Year Ostricization of China

Following defeat of Chinese nationalist forces in 1946, the interest of Communist China was to be free of outside influence in the effort to apply all of its energy to building a new nation. U.S. interest, according to some observers, required an effort to remain in contact with the government of an immense country, strategically located, and containing almost a billion hardworking and enterprising people with several thousand years of history of illustrious achievement. Instead the United States foreclosed all policy options by ostracizing Communist China. The ostrich-like policy of burying the U.S. head in the sand may have contributed significantly to China's ability to consolidate a strong communist system of government. It also invigorated anti-communist feelings within the United States, leading to one of the darkest chapters in our domestic history — McCarthyism, which diverted attention from realistic foreign policy objectives and led to permanent paranoia over communism. That paranoia erased from the minds of U.S. policy makers the significance of the geopolitical relationship of the United States and China, delaying a rapprochement in the self-interest of both. Not until the 1970's did the United States suddenly rediscover China.

Post WWII Support of French Colonialism in Vietnam

Immediately following the end of the war, France moved to reassert her colonial mastery of Vietnam, described by the French as the jewel of their colonial empire. Resumption of a colonial role obviously was in the interest of France. The interest of the United States, on the other hand, was thought to include support of efforts to eradicate all vestiges of colonialism throughout the world. North Vietnam's interest was a unified and independent Vietnam, free not only of French influence but also of Chinese and Soviet interference. (In part, therefore, the interests of the United States and North Vietnam were parallel.) But France, weakened by war, turned to the United States for support of her attempt to return to Vietnam. As part of her tactics, France held hostage her support of and participation in the American initiative to achieve political unification of Europe. In agreeing to support the French return to Vietnam, U.S. policy officials sacrificed the potential of productive relationships with China. the USSR, and North Vietnam; and the decision seriously reduced for years the credibility of U.S. support of anti-colonial movements in all parts of the world.

Thirty-Year Involvement in Vietnam

Immediately after WWII, a unified and independent Vietnam was the focus of interest of North Vietnamese leaders. Initially, the United States supported them but later withdrew in favor of supporting France's vain desire to resume her colonial mastery of Vietnam. When the French were defeated by the Vietnamese, the United States chose to replace France in Vietnam in order to establish a bulwark against the spread of communism, which France had been counted on to provide. Once in Vietnam, the United States compounded its problems by attempting to create an independent democratic state in South Vietnam without knowing any thing about the Vietnamese people. These decisions and actions sacrificed any positive future relationship with Vietnam and exacerbated relations with China and the USSR.

The 25-Year Quarantine of Cuba

Castro's (therefore Cuba's) initial interest, like China's, was to build a new political system free of outside interference. One could postulate that at the same time U.S. interest was to remain in contact and, with the help of Cuba's latin American neighbors, try to exert whatever influence was possible to moderate Cuba's behavior. But, U.S. policy officials put their heads into the sand, as they had done with China; and other nations, especially the USSR, have been reaping the advantages ever since. The policy followed by the U.S. may have contributed to the strength of communism in Cuba and led eventually to the U. S.-Soviet missile crisis.

Reassessment of US. foreign policy — what goes into it and what comes out of it — is long over due

Measured against waning U.S. influence in the world, the time left for reassessment is short, if we are to retain our world leadership.

The objective of reassessment is to identify why U.S. policy makers repeat the same kinds of errors (no matter which political party holds the reins of power), deduce some lessons, and then reformulate, through open discussion, the basic precepts of American policy. A first step should be examination of the fundamental concepts, beliefs, and attitudes ingrained in Americans that flaw the U.S. approach to foreign policy.

During the decades from independence to WWII, the United States evolved into a powerful and wealthy democracy. The evolution was made possible by essentially geopolitical factors: geographic location, size, endowment of natural resources, and an energetically enterprising people imbued with a free political philosophy gained by courageous individuals of vision who risked all for their beliefs. Geographic location made possible fulfillment of the U.S. desire to be isolated from the rest of the world. Isolation contributed to evolution of the concepts, beliefs, and attitudes that require examination.

WWI had little perceptible permanent impact on U.S. foreign policy. WWII, however, at last awakened Americans to the relationship of the other nations to U.S. freedom and security and to the dangers of ignoring other nations.

The post-WWII foreign policy devised to carry out the new U.S. leadership role in the world incorporated, in various forms, the fundamental concepts, beliefs and attitudes earlier cited. Although the United States was already strong enough to obtain a place in the world, its foreign policy - to its peril - failed to incorporate, or at least take full account of, the realities underlying international relationships:

• A nation's place in the world is obtained (and retained) by strength (economic more than military), by industriousness (creativity along with hard work), by vigilant application of intelligence (wisdom and judgement as well as knowledge), and by behavior (understanding of and respect for national cultural and social differences as well as sovereign rights).

• National self-interest is the core of foreign policy.

• Security and other national interests impacting security are the only necessary elements of self-interest.

• While morality is an ingredient of international relationships, it is not the keystone.

• Nations can not safely be categorized for foreign policy reasons except by their self-interests.

Because of the failure to take account of international realities, U.S. post-WWII foreign policy has not been understood by other nations. It has raised serious questions, created doubt, puzzlement, and concern and has provided avoidable, sometimes golden, opportunities for other nations to undermine the U.S. place in the world.

We could learn something from an examination of the peculiarly American concepts, beliefs and attitudes that influence U.S. makers of foreign policy.

Manifest Destiny.

Originally confined to belief in the inevitable expansion of the United States in North America, manifest destiny has itself been expanded to mean inevitable U.S. pre-eminence in the world based upon power, wealth, democratic principles and innate superiority. The concept has a mesmerizing effect leading to an assumption of the rightness of all American action and, much more important, failure to assess or correctly judge the desires and intentions of other nations.

God and America.

Belief, in the foreign policy context, in God's support of America thrusts Christian moral philosophy into foreign policy. That leads U.S. decision makers to conduct international relations using a set of moral standards and rules not generally used by other nations. It leads to the conclusion that nations may be categorized as "friends" or "enemies," with all the moral baggage attaching to those words. It obscures the fact that other nations, too, have their gods - be they Muhammad, dominance of international trade, or white supremacy!

Democracy The Only Acceptable Political Ideology.

A viable democratic political system requires hard work, a stable and expanding economy, attachment to certain political principles, and a particular mix of territory, resources, and people. Some nations are incapable of sustaining a democratic system. Others have social systems not amenable to democracy. Some nations are just as devoted to their particular political ideology as Americans are to democracy. Thus, every effort to spread democracy around the world encounters a variety of obstacles. (For example, the U.S. effort to democratize South Vietnam.) In any case, democracy cannot be imposed, it must be desired. History teaches that a variety of political ideologies have always existed and always will. Trying to change all of them misuses valuable resources.

Superiority of Americans and American Ideas and Things

While Americans have much to be proud of, people of other nations do also. (Do we still believe, for example, in the superiority of the American automobile?) Persistent belief in total American superiority leads to serious misjudgments and foreign alienation; it ignores reality.

Problem Solving

Numerous international problems defy solution. Others are best left untouched or solve themselves over time. Still others are not worth solving, since they are irrelevant to U.S. freedom and security. To be possessed by the belief that all problems have a solution and, therefore, must be solved even leads to conjuring up problems that do not exist! A foreign official once remarked to a U.S. AID official that Americans work out solutions and then look around for a country to which to apply them!

Relevance of Other Nations to U.S. Freedom and Security

WWII cured Americans of their long-held belief that other nations were irrelevant to U.S. freedom and security. (The lesson could have been learned from WWI!) Unfortunately, Americans now tend to believe that all nations are relevant to U.S. freedom and security. This belief leads to a badly over-extended foreign policy, which projects an image of an insecure United States willing to spend large amounts of its treasure in the attempt to buy friendship and cooperation in all parts of the world. Uncle Sam, always a good guy, became Uncle Sucker! A military maxim is appropriate: He who tries to apply strength everywhere ends up being weak everywhere.

What Do We Do Next?

How should we go about reassessing, refining and maturing American foreign policy? Consideration should be given to the following:

• Carefully re-define what we perceive to be our national interest, focusing it on what is necessary to preserve the U.S. place in the world. Security is the principle element, along with freedom; but that should be reassessed without being paranoid about communism. (The average U.S. citizen is uninformed about communism and, in any case, is more afraid of AIDS!) is not communism best treated as another, dangerous for certain, political ideology instead of a dread disease that must be eradicated everywhere no matter what the cost? Perhaps the effort would be made easier if we kept in mind that communism bears within it the seed of its own destruction: human nature. The desire for freedom of choice is inculcated in all human beings and can not be eradicated permanently. Other human desires, such as acceptable living conditions, freedom to compete, and greed can be suppressed but not eliminated. Of all political ideologies, democracy provides the best context for the exercitation of human nature. Perhaps, then, one of the wisest ways to oppose communism, which we must, is to demonstrate the clear superiority of democracy and co-opt the natural human desires displayed by the peoples of other nations.

• The re-definition of national self-interest should include a clear and concise perception of exactly what are the other national interests that have a significant impact on U.S. freedom and security. We should eliminate all irrelevant interests from this category. For example, we should refrain from forcing our moral standards onto other nations and reduce the place of morality in foreign policy. Morality will always be there simply because we are, in general, a moral people. But we should recognize that numerous kinds of moralities exist in the world and take account of them in our foreign policy.

• Foreign policy can not be viable unless based on a detailed comprehension of the self-interests of other nations judged to be important to U.S. freedom and security. We must always know where they are coming from and why and make any necessary adjustments. Not many adjustments are likely to be necessary, in view of our power and wealth.

• We should rid ourselves of the twin beliefs that we must democratize the world and that we must make the world safe for democracy. (Are we not better served by natural pluralism?) Our focus, instead, should be on making the world safe for a free United States.

• We should discipline ourselves sufficiently to refrain from trying to solve all the problems of the world and from trying to buy the allegiance of other nations.

• Finally, we should try to rid ourselves of our deep sense of insecurity (growing out of our previous long and self-imposed isolation in the world), in order to improve our capability to achieve a valid perception of ourselves and the world.

Most governments in the international community of nations understand that the United States does not — and should not — have answers to all the world's problems. We Americans have not yet accepted that reality — in part due to a system we have devised to churn out answers even to non-existent questions. Perhaps we are prisoners of and are overwhelmed by our own system.

Most governments understand that nation-to-nation relations must be based on reciprocity. The U.S. government seems not to be convinced, in view of the numerous instances of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, with no thought of granting reciprocal rights.

Most governments understand all to well how the mechanism of international intercourse functions. The U.S. government either does not understand or prefers to ignore the mechanism.

Looming larger than any other of the considerations addressed in this commentary is one that inflicts the most injury on American foreign policy: failure to understand or to evaluate carefully what makes other nations tick, what their objectives are, and their methods for achieving them. Despite the fact that two U.S. presidents have been damaged by Iran, in the international arena Americans are like children playing with matches; they have not yet learned they can be burned.

. . . Robert Sturgill . . .

© Copyright 1988
Institute for domestic Tranquility