American Foreign Policy in the 1990s

Administration officials have acknowledged — belatedly and with reluctance — the end of the cold war. The reluctance appears directly related to the Administration's inability to grapple with international relations without the cold war. After all, foreign policy formulation was much simpler when a single concept underlay it: the eradication of communism at any cost. Unfortunately, the single concept frequently led to simple minded foreign policy — Iran-Contra for example — directly related to America's paranoia about national security along with it propensity for thinking and acting emotionally rather than pragmatically.

The ongoing dismantling of the communist political and economic system is generating events far more significant than the end of the cold war. Being generated are profound changes in political, military and economic relationships—changes with the potential for altering the nation-state system we have known for the past 200 years.

Confronting the United States for immediate attention is an international situation in which the economic competition is much more relevant than military competition and in which opportunity must be grasped now to guide numerous nations around the world toward democracy, particularly in a Europe whose face is changing so rapidly as soon to be new. Lacking to date is any sign the Administration has even a concept let alone a plan to deal with these events.

Since the end of World War II, the United States was supposed to be maturing. As a nation among older and more sophisticated nations. There are few indications, however, of American comprehension of how international relations must be managed to maintain a place of strength for the United States (see "Commentary on American Foreign Policy," We the People, Vol. 3 No. 3, October 1988.) As a matter of fact, one could easily conclude that our single-minded pursuit of the eradication of communism not only blinded Americans to the workings of international relations but also was a substitute for a more enlightened foreign policy—one of the quality and maturity we must have now.

Two other factors are complicating the evolution of a mature foreign policy for the United States. One is the American tendency to formulate policies for the benefit of U.S. minority interests instead of national interest. For example unreasoning support of Israel to satisfy the Jewish lobby, financial largess for Poland to satisfy Americans of Polish extraction, and opposition to apartheid to satisfy America's blacks and the guilt complex of America's whites. The second factor is the myriad of economic and social problems the nation faces at home: the national debt, the trade imbalance, drug use and all its consequences, a damaged environment, an aged physical infrastructure, and the syndrome of greed afflicting all levels of our society which results in economic damage far beyond costs such as the S & L bailout. Sad, isn't it, that at the very moment in history America should step forward as the champion of democratic movements all over the globe, we have neither the resources nor the moral fiber. Some observers suggest a strong foreign policy will produce a strong domestic policy. The opposite is more in evidence. Without careful establishment of priorities, domestic as well as foreign, the nation could suffer a bad case of policy indigestion leading to a gradual and permanent decline in the health, and well-being of the United States.

Architects of America's foreign policy must rethink the national interest at this momentous point in history in order to devise a strong foreign policy for the 1990s. They must reassess, refine, and mature our policy by carefully and pragmatically redefining our true national interests and those of other nations. (Commentary on American Foreign Policy, op. cit.).

A number of general concepts must be borne in mind:

• With the end of the cold war, international economic competition, already in full flower, must become paramount for the United States in order for us to maintain a position of strength in the world, sadly, our lack of competitiveness is apparent. Sadly, insufficient attention is being given to reducing defense costs. Even assuming retention of agreed numbers and types of nuclear weapons, in the interest of maintaining their deterrent value, savings can be made in the arena of conventional forces and weapons, where the costs are larger. We can no longer afford to protect and police the world. That policy was a loser from the start.

• The U.S. relationships with the USSR will no longer be pivotal. An expanded Europe will replace the Soviet Union as our own chief competitor—economic not military. Moreover, the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must change simply because the USSR is changing. Ahead for the Soviet Union lies a course not fully known, even if Gorbachev has a plan, perhaps leading to a smaller nation with a changed political and economic philosophy. Although the United States is some what of a bystander, we can assist—in careful, measured, non-grandiose ways—the maintenance of stability in the Soviet Union. The stability of the USSR is greatly in our national interest. Our assistance must take place in coordination with our allies in Europe and with china.

• The relationship of the USSR with Europe is primarily a matter for the USSR and Europe, except for two aspects: the future of Germany and the establishment of a "European Family" (Gorbachev's concept) inclusive of the Soviet Union but not the United States. America, damaged by Germany in two World Wars, must have a voice, even if not the leading voice, in what Germany becomes. The United States must be included in the European Family, which would be a formidable economic threat to the United States if we were not a member. Moreover, the concept of a European Family may well include all of North America and some if not all of South America.

• The political and economic development and stability of the nations now constituting Eastern Europe are primarily responsibile for what is now Western Europe, except for the political evolution of East Germany, which is part of the future of Germany. The United States should encourage democratization but not assume a large share of funding it.

• America, all too familiar with domestic ethnic strife, must be prepared to take policy account of destablizing violence of an ethnic/political and related economic nature, some of which pre-dates World War I but was dormant after World War II, and is now resurgent. Establishment of a European Family will assist amelioration of these ancient en mities.

• Lastly, the United States must become an ideological bridge between the Orient and the occident. Accommodations of legitimate Eastern aspirations must be found. America's multi-racial society and experience could be instrumental in avoidance of serious breaches between the real East and West.

The general concepts just described could be considered the framework of American foreign policy in the 1990s and beyond. Such a policy would be honed to our real national interests and thus less costly. It would allow U.S. officials time, energy, and money to devote to solution for our formidable domestic problems. Resolution of domestic issues will have a significant impact on our ability to conduct a mature and pragmatic foreign policy.

...Robert Sturgill...

© Copyright 1990
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